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Foreign Affairs Legalism: A Critique
Daniel Abebe and Eric A. Posner1
February 9, 2010
Abstract. Foreign affairs legalism, the dominant approach in academic
scholarship on foreign relations law, holds that courts should abandon their
traditional deference to the executive in foreign relations, and that courts and
Congress should take a more activist role in foreign relations than in the past.
Foreign affairs legalists argue that greater judicial involvement in foreign
relations would curb executive abuses and promote international law. We argue
that foreign affairs legalism rests on implausible assumptions about the
incentives and capacities of courts. In U.S. history the executive has given more
support to international law than the judiciary or Congress has; this suggests that
foreign affairs legalism would retard rather than spur the advance of international
law.

Scholarship on foreign affairs law—the body of law, mainly constitutional, that
governs the foreign affairs of the United States—reflects a striking divide between the
courts and the academy. In the courts, the dominant judicial approach to foreign affairs
law is “executive primacy”—the view that the judges should defer to the executive’s
judgments about foreign affairs.2 In the academy, the dominant approach is what we will
call “foreign affairs legalism.” Foreign affairs legalism holds that courts should impose
more restrictions on the executive than they have in the past, or that Congress should play
a greater role in foreign affairs. This normative argument rests on two usually implicit
descriptive premises: that courts and Congress have the capacity and motivation to
restrain the executive, and that the courts and Congress will do so for the sake of
promoting international law.
This disjunction between academic and judicial thought matters today more than
it ever did in the past. The conflict with Al Qaeda has generated an enormous
jurisprudence, including some cases that reflect a new legalist sensibility in tension with
the old commitment to executive primacy.3 Globalization has produced more crossborder conflicts involving trade, migration, human rights, and investment—and the
debate between executive primacy and foreign affairs legalism will help determine how
courts handle these conflicts.
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For a historical discussion of the executive’s dominance in foreign affairs, see generally, HAROLD H.
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Despite its prominence in the academy, there is no official school of foreign
affairs legalism; no single scholar explicitly defends it. However, much of the foreign
affairs scholarship of the last twenty years advances this account. The problem is that the
argument is mostly implicit. In this Essay, our minimal goal is to lay out the distinctive
empirical and normative assumptions of foreign affairs legalism. We also argue, more
ambitiously, that foreign affairs legalism rests on unproven and inaccurate assumptions
about the capacities and motivations of courts and the executive, and reflects confusion
about the nature of international law. Of particular importance, foreign affairs legalists
assume—falsely—that the judiciary seeks to advance international law, while the
executive seeks to limit it.
In part I, we describe foreign affairs legalism as it manifests itself in the work of a
few representative scholars. In part II, we describe the weaknesses in this account,
propose an alternative approach to foreign affairs law, and suggest that our approach
promotes the continued development of international law.
I. Foreign Affairs Legalism
A. Executive Primacy
Foreign affairs legalists promote judicial involvement in foreign affairs, arguing
that the judiciary is the branch of government that most reliably advances international
law. They regard the executive branch as intrinsically hostile to international law, reject
executive primacy in foreign affairs, and aim to constrain executive decisionmaking
authority. The executive and the judiciary in this story are antagonists. The executive is
obsessed with power and national self-interest; the judiciary cares about the rule of law
and the good of the broader international community. Foreign affairs legalists are in this
way “pro-judiciary” and “pro-international law.”
Because foreign affairs legalism is a reaction to executive primacy, it is best to
start with this idea. Executive primacy means that when the executive interprets
international law and domestic law that regulates foreign relations, courts give greater
deference to those interpretations than they do to other interpretations of the executive.
This stance goes back to the founding generation, where proponents of executive
primacy, such as Alexander Hamilton, argued that the executive needs freedom of action
in foreign affairs because of the fluidity of relations among states and the ever-present
danger of war.4 Secrecy, speed, and decisiveness are at a premium, and these are
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characteristics of the executive,5 not of the courts, which are slow and decentralized.
Courts have largely, though not always, accepted this argument. Courts have provided a
substantial level of deference to executive determinations on a number of foreign affairs
law issues related to international law, including treaty interpretation6 and treaty
termination.7 Courts consider the executive’s views on the meaning of customary
international law (CIL),8 and generally defer to the executive on the application of head
of state immunity.9 They have permitted executives to evade the onerous supermajority
requirements in the Article II treaty process by entering congressional-executive and
executive agreements.10 And they have developed avoidance doctrines to limit their own
capacity to adjudicate foreign affairs cases, including the political question doctrine, the
act of state doctrine, international comity rules, and state secrecy rules.11
Foreign affair legalists believe that judicial deference opens the way to abuse by
the executive. In their criticism of a proposal by one of us and Cass Sunstein that the
Chevron deference doctrine should be extended to executive actions touching on foreign
affairs,12 Derek Jinks and Neil Katyal display the characteristic legalist suspicion of the
executive.13 They argue that increased judicial deference to executive decisionmaking
will have negative consequences for international law.
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Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference
to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 201-02 (2006).
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is entitled to great weight.”). See also, David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41
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explain outcomes in treaty interpretation cases).
7
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447, 473-76 (1913) (executive determines whether treaty has been terminated or lapsed due to changed
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Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (exiled president of Haiti); Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d
620 (7th Cir. 2004) (violations of jus cogens norms).
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See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)
American Insurance Association v, Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003).
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See infra.
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See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L. J. 1170
(2007) (arguing that the executive is best-placed to resolve difficult foreign affairs questions requiring
judgments of policy and principle, and that the judiciary should defer to the executive based on its foreign
policy expertise).
13
See Derek Jinks & Neal K. Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L. J. 1230, 1230
(2007) (“We maintain that increased judicial deference to the executive in the foreign relations domain is
inappropriate.”).
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The United Nations, whatever its limitations, now provides a highly
legitimated institutional vehicle for global cooperation in an astonishingly
wide array of substantive domains—including national security and
human rights. International human rights and humanitarian law provide a
widely accepted normative framework that defines with increasing
precision the constitutional principles of the international order. These
developments, and many others like them, provide an institutional
structure by which and normative framework within which effective and
principled international cooperation is possible. Posner and Sunstein
would set that project back when the United States, and the world, need it
most.14
Jinks and Katyal believe that deference to the executive in foreign affairs harms
international cooperation because the executive is hostile to international law and
cooperation. The judiciary, by contrast, promotes international law.
Why would the executive be hostile to international law and the judiciary
favorable to it? Jinks and Katyal’s main argument is that the executive cares about the
short-term—only until the next election. The judiciary, because it enjoys lifetime tenure,
takes the longer view.15 And the longer view is one that recognizes the importance of
international law for American security and prosperity.
The normative implication of the argument is straightforward. Because the
judiciary supports international law and the executive rejects it, and because international
law is good and necessary, power should be transferred from the executive to the courts.
Courts should derive their power either from an interpretation of the Constitution that
emphasizes limited executive power and robust judicial review, or from statutes that
regulate foreign relations, which Congress should enact.16 This is the essence of foreign
affairs legalism.
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Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1262. (“Presidents are nearsighted in a way that other government actors are not, particularly the
judiciary, which tends to be farsighted. The difference in outlook is a direct result of the Constitution’s text
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TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992) (urging courts to be less deferential to the executive in foreign relations);
HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR, 185-206 (1990) (proposing that Congress pass framework legislation in the form of “National
Security Reform Act” to restrain the executive); Oona Hathaway, Presidential Power over International
Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L. REV. 140, 241-259 (2009) (proposing that Congress more
carefully delegate international lawmaking authority to President and develop a new system of delegations
patterned after the Administrative Procedure Act).
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B. Three Versions of Foreign Affairs Legalism
Foreign affairs legalism appears in a number of guises. We cannot survey all of
them. Here, we present three examples.
1. Executive and Judicial Competition over International Law
Eyal Benvenisti argues that national courts should attempt to constrain their
national executives by cooperating with other national courts in foreign countries, in
enforcing international law. Benvenisti’s argument has descriptive and normative
components. The descriptive claim is that national courts and national executives are
antagonists who disagree about the role of international law, with the courts having a
more benign attitude toward it. The normative argument is that courts should therefore be
encouraged to assert themselves in defiance of the executive.
Let us begin with the descriptive argument. Globalization, external economic
pressure, and powerful international institutions force developing countries17 to
harmonize practices around global standards. In doing so, their governments often ignore
the will of the people and the opposition of local institutions. “Governments are more
than ever the captives of narrow domestic interests, hence unable to represent broad
constituencies; and the contemporary world of diplomacy exposes governments to
increasing pressure, so that quite a few would actually benefit from domestic legal
constraints that would tie their hands in the international bargaining process.”18 However,
national courts are not as constrained as national governments are. There are two reasons
for this. First, national courts are self-interested and believe that they can preserve their
independence by interpreting international law to restrict the authority of national
governments and international institutions. Second, “national courts have come to realize
that, under conditions of increased external pressures, allowing the government carte
blanche to act freely in world politics actually impoverishes the domestic democratic and
judicial processes and reduces the opportunity of most citizens to use these processes to
shape outcomes.”19 So courts have an institutional self-interest in maintaining their
independence and a more public-spirited desire to preserve democracy.
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Benvenisti suggests that since powerful countries with stronger domestic political processes are better
placed to withstand the pressures of globalization, their national courts might not be “as assertive in
safeguarding the domestic political processes.” Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic
Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts,” 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 248 (2008).
18
Id. at 245.
19
Id. at 247.
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National courts engage in trans-judicial cooperation and use international law to
develop a “united front” against the erosion of their autonomy and the pressures of
globalization:20
National courts join forces to offer meaningful judicial review of
governmental action, even intergovernmental action. In this quest to
restrict executive latitude, international law looms large as a key tool
alongside comparative constitutional law. Thus, references to foreign law
and to international law are being transformed from the shield that
protected the government from judicial review to the sword by which the
government’s (or governments’) case is struck down.21
National courts in this way draw on international law in order to constrain their
governments.22
According to Benvenisti and co-author George Downs, national governments
fight back by stripping international institutions of power and splintering them.23 These
“fragmentation” strategies include (1) drafting narrowly focused agreements; (2)
negotiating detailed agreements in infrequent, one-time multilateral settings; (3) limiting
the influence of international courts or bureaucracies within international institutions; and
(4) switching the institutional venue of negotiations if the negotiations do not proceed
well for the powerful states.24 “[A]s [coercive, openly power-driven] strategies have
become increasingly contested and delegitimized . . . fragmentation strategies [serve] as
an alternative means of achieving the same end in a less visible and politically costly
way.”25 Both the national governments and the national courts strategically use
international law and tribunals; the former to exercise power, the latter to constrain the
national governments’ exercise of it.
So far the argument seems like a purely descriptive account of competition
between the executive and the judiciary over control of foreign affairs. However,
Benvenisti and Downs draw a normative conclusion. Traditional judicial deference to the
executive “was a mistake which had serious unintended consequences . . . limit[ing] the
influence of national courts on the design and subsequent operation of the rapidly
20

Id. at 250.
Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by
National Courts,” 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 243 (2008).
22
For discussion of this phenomenon, judicial cooperation and global governance, see generally, Eyal
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of
International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59 (2009); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Court
Cooperation, Executive Accountability and Global Governance, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &POL. (2009).
23
Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the
Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 596 (2007).
24
Id. at 610-18.
25
Id. at 598.
21
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expanding international regulatory apparatus when more active engagement on their part
might have led to a more coherent and less fragmented international legal system.”26
Courts have been assertive, but not assertive enough.
National judiciaries, coordinating with their counterparts in other democracies,
should act as a bulwark against national executives and their efforts to fragment
international law and dilute the efficacy of international legal rules. Applied to the United
States, this approach would require a shift of foreign affairs decisionmaking authority
away from the executive, and to the judiciary.
2. Balanced Institutional Participation
Our second example of foreign affairs legalism comes from the work of Harold
Koh. Koh focuses on the role of norms in encouraging state compliance with
international law and the role of the judiciary in ensuring that shared norms and practices
are internalized in domestic law and politics. His account focuses on interaction among
agents “in a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to make,
interpret, enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of transnational law.”27 It emphasizes
“internalization”—a process that results in states complying with international law not
because they fear retaliation from other states if they do not, but because of domestic
processes.28 “Through a complex process of rational self-interest and norm
internalization—at times spurred by transnational litigation—international legal norms
seep into, are internalized, and become entrenched in domestic legal and political
processes.”29
Koh refers to his account as balanced institutional participation. Although Koh
focuses less on national courts than Benvenisti’s does, national courts remain a central
agent. Koh advocates an “approach to national security reform, predicated upon
principles of restraining the executive, revitalizing Congress, and reinvolving the
courts.”30 He also is a longtime advocate of Alien Tort Statute litigation, in which courts
adjudicate public international law disputes between private actors.31 Since the modern
executive has been the dominant actor in foreign affairs, Koh’s theory ends up highly

26

Id. at 60.
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV.
181, 183-84 (1996).
28
Id. at 184.
29
Id.
30
HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRANCONTRA AFFAIR, 185 (1990).
31
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Restoring America’s Human Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL J. INT’L L.
635 (2007); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1480 (2003).
27
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critical of the executive in American law; and indeed, Koh is a prominent critic of
executive power in foreign affairs.
Again, the question arises as to the connection between the descriptive analysis—
which focuses on how international norms are “internalized” into domestic law—and the
normative criticism of executive power and the celebration of the judiciary. The
connections are different in the two areas of Koh’s work—foreign affairs law and
international law. In his work on foreign affairs law, Koh makes a constitutional
argument. According to Koh, the Constitution requires judicial participation in foreign
affairs in the form of concurrent decisionmaking authority with the executive. As the
United States developed from a weak state (surrounded by Spanish, French and English
possessions) in the late eighteenth century to a world power dominant in the Western
Hemisphere by the late nineteenth century, American national interests and
responsibilities outgrew the initial allocation of foreign affairs authority, resulting in a
greater role for the executive. Enhanced judicial involvement is necessary to recover the
foreign affairs authority improperly assumed by the executive and return to the
Constitution’s original shared decisionmaking structure.32 For Koh, an executive with a
relatively free hand in foreign affairs might have been tolerable in the eighteenth century
when the United States was too weak to abuse that power; today, the judiciary is needed
to prevent abuse in entirely different circumstances where the United States is the
dominant power.
In his work on international law, Koh celebrates judicial intervention—both by
national and international courts—on normative rather than constitutional grounds. In
Alien Tort Statute litigation, American courts have heard cases brought by aliens on
account of human rights violations. This litigation has produced some successes,
including both symbolic victories against judgment-proof individuals and monetary
settlements with corporations allegedly complicit in human rights abuses committed by
governments. Human rights treaties have famously weak enforcement mechanisms—
some of them create toothless committees or commissions, some of them nothing at all.
So litigation in the United States provides a potential avenue for enforcement. For this
reason, Koh supports this litigation.33

32

See generally, HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
AFFAIR (1990). For a similar argument, see Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in
Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 806 (1989) (arguing that the foreign affairs decisionmaking
authority is distributed to all three branches of government, not exclusively with the executive).
33
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991).
THE IRAN-CONTRA
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3. Transnational Government Networks
A third account focuses on “networks” involving the sub-units of national
governments rather than the national governments themselves. These sub-units include
regulatory agencies and courts, which jointly develop policy, harmonize regulatory
standards34 and enforce international law. According to its leading proponent, AnneMarie Slaughter, democratic constitutional structures encourage dialogue among the
executive, legislative and judicial agencies of different countries.35 In particular, judges
discuss issues common to their legal systems, cite decisions from other constitutional
legal systems, and share social and professional networks, possibly leading to
convergence around shared legal norms to resolve general legal questions.36
Slaughter never clearly explains the mechanism of influence. “Transnational
judicial dialogue,” as she puts it, is a lofty way of referring to conversations that judges
have with each other when they meet at international conferences. It is possible that these
conversations cause judges to adopt the legal views of their counterparts, but it is just as
possible that the conversations have no effect on their judicial activities, or even lead to
greater disagreement rather than convergence. Even if judges are influenced in a positive
way by foreign counterparts, judges in most countries have very limited authority to
make policy—much less than in the United States. It seems doubtful that they could have
more than a marginal effect on the foreign affairs of their countries. And in many
countries, judges have little or no independence; any attempt to constrain their national
governments and executives would fail.
Like Benvenisti, Downs, and Koh, Slaughter advances a descriptive thesis, but
constructs atop of it dramatic normative implications. Judicial networks “could create a
genuine global rule of law without centralized global institutions and could engage,
socialize, support and constrain government officials of every type in every nation.”37 As
a global community of courts develops, judges view “themselves as capable of

34

See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and
Disaggregated Democracies, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041 (2003).
35
See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, 64-103 (2004); Ann-Marie Slaughter,
International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 506 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283 (2004). For related
discussions, see, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429
(2003); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and
the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Peter Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign
Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649 (2002); Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 401 (2000); Peter Spiro, Globalization, International Law, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 567 (2000).
36
SLAUGHTER, supra at 64-103.
37
Id. at 261.
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independent action in both international and domestic realms [and] are increasingly
coming to recognize each other as participants in a common judicial enterprise.”38
Again, the mechanism is obscure. Why would judges enforce global norms rather
than national norms? Because Slaughter does not provide a theory of judicial motivation,
it is hard to understand why she thinks that they would compel national officials to
comply with global norms. But the implications of her argument are clear. The courts, not
the executives, have the primary role to play in advancing international law. They should
constrain, not defer to, national executives.
C. Common Themes of Foreign Affairs Legalism
The three accounts differ in many respects but share three common themes. First,
the authors believe that the judiciary has already displayed an interest in, and capacity
for, restraining the executive’s foreign affairs powers. This empirical claim helps counter
sometimes extreme statements from the other side—that judges simply have no ability to
intervene in foreign affairs, or no interest in doing so.
Second, the authors believe that when judges do intervene in foreign affairs, they
promote international law and international cooperation by constraining the executive. As
a result of electoral incentives and other political constraints, executives seek to advance
the short-term national interest. Judges care about the long term, and this disposes them
to a more cosmopolitan outlook.
Third, the authors endorse the development of a “constitutional legal order” or
“global rule of law” and suggest that executive dominance in foreign affairs interferes
with the achievement of those goals, while greater judicial participation facilitates them.
Foreign affairs legalists view the promotion and development of international law as
normatively desirable.
D. Implications of Foreign Affairs Legalism for Foreign Affairs Law
Foreign affairs legalism has implications for many contentious foreign affairs law
questions and in this section we describe them. In doing so, we will cite to scholarship
that reflects the doctrinal implications of foreign affairs legalism. However, we do not
claim that every scholar that subscribes to a doctrinal position consistent with the
implications of foreign affairs legalism must necessarily accept the entirety of the
accounts and common themes outlined above. Our purpose is to describe arguments, not
categorize scholars.
38

Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 193 (2003).
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We are aware that the U.S. Constitution’s text, foreign affairs law precedent, and
historical practice may lead to doctrinal conclusions that, while consistent with foreign
affairs legalism, do not necessarily reflect it. At the same time, however, it is also clear
that many contemporary foreign affairs law questions cannot be resolved in a
determinative manner solely by reference to text, doctrine, and practice. Resolving these
foreign affairs law questions rest on policy judgments regarding the value of international
law, the benefits of a globalized legal system, and the institutional competencies of the
executive and the judiciary. Foreign affairs legalism reflects such policy judgments; its
implications for foreign affairs law are discussed below.
Narrow Interpretation of Executive’s Constitutional Powers. The Constitution
vests the president with executive powers and the office of commander-in-chief.39
Foreign affairs legalists argue that the executive power is the power to execute laws
enacted by Congress, and the commander-in-chief power refers to control over tactical
operations once Congress has declared or authorized war.40 By contrast, the executive
primacy view holds that the Constitution gives the president general authority to conduct
foreign affairs, including the power to initiate hostilities. The two positions also divide
over judicial review. The legalist camp argues that courts should ensure that the executive
acts lawfully; the executive primacy camp urges courts to treat disputes over executive
power as political questions to be resolved by Congress and the president.
Treaty Interpretation. Foreign affairs legalists argue that courts should have the
primary role in treaty interpretation. They criticize the courts’ tendency to defer to the
executive’s interpretation of treaties.41
Treaties Are Automatically Self-Executing and Trump Domestic Law. Article II of
the Constitution confers on the President the authority “by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”42 Article VI of the Constitution states that “all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.”43
To ensure that treaties are domestically enforceable, foreign affairs legalists view treaties
as automatically self-executing once ratified.44 Foreign affairs legalism is skeptical of the
39

U.S. CONST., ART. II , §§ 1-2.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 84-87 (1990); LOUIS FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 185-207 (1995).
41
See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1992); David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty
Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 497 (2007).
42
U.S. CONST., ART. II , § 2, cl. 2
43
Id., ART. VI, cl. 2
44
See generally, LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 201 (1996).
For a critical discussion of the non-self execution doctrine, see Carlos M. Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the
40
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concept of ratified, non-self-executing treaties that would require additional domestic
implementing legislation to serve as a rule of decision enforceable against the states.45
Foreign affairs legalists also believe that treaties should have priority over earlier enacted
legislation (which is current law) and even subsequently enacted legislation (contrary to
current law),46 and that the existing presumption against implying private rights of action
from treaty obligations should be dropped.47
Customary International Law Is Federal Common Law. Customary international
law (CIL) consists of norms “result[ing] from a general and consistent practice of states
followed from a sense of legal obligation.”48 CIL has been treated historically as both
general common law and federal common law within the American legal system, with
different implications for CIL’s domestic legal status and enforceability against the states.
Foreign affairs legalists view CIL as federal common law to be incorporated by judges
and enforced domestically;49 and hold that CIL preempts inconsistent state law.50 It
rejects an alternative understanding of CIL as general common law that requires
congressional incorporation or political branch approval51 to gain domestic legal status as
federal common law.

Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008);
Carlos M. Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999).
45
See, e.g., David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1 (2002); David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697 (2003); David Sloss, Self-Executing Treaties and Domestic
Judicial Remedies, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 346 (2004); David Sloss, Schizophrenic Treaty Law, 43
TEX. INT’L L.J. 15 (2007). But see, Curtis Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties,
102 AM. J. INT’L. L. 540 (2008); Curtis Bradley, International Delegations, The Structural Constitution,
and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Curtis Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131 (2008).
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Interpretation of Statutes Touching on Foreign Relations. Many statutes control
the way that the executive conducts foreign affairs; others address more general concerns
that sometimes have implications for foreign relations. Some scholars have argued that
when these statutes are ambiguous, a reasonable interpretation advanced by the executive
should be entitled to judicial deference.52 Foreign affairs legalists believe that the courts
should not give deference to the executive’s interpretation.53
Statutory Interpretation and the Charming Betsy Canon. The Charming Betsy
canon holds that vague or ambiguous statutes should be not interpreted by courts in a
manner inconsistent with international law if at all possible. Foreign affairs legalists
generally support the expansive application of the Charming Betsy canon, even when it
might conflict with traditional foreign affairs deference to executive interpretations of
international law55 or require the use of international norms to interpret individual rights56
and constitutional protections.57 U.S. Courts have been less consistent. In the recent case
of Al-Bihani v. Obama, the U.S. Court of Appeals refused to interpret the Authorization
for Use of Military Force in light of international law.58 This decision greatly
disappointed foreign affairs legalists.
54

Alien Tort Statute Litigation. The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides that “[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”59 To
encourage the enforcement of international human rights law60 and promote human rights
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norms,61 foreign affairs legalists interpret the ATS to allow alien nationals to bring suit
against other alien nationals in U.S. courts for torts in violation of CIL that occurred in
third countries. Foreign affairs legalists also interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain62 as a clear endorsement for continued international human
rights litigation under the ATS despite its skeptical language and suggestion of case-bycase deference to the executive.63
The Primacy of International Institutions and Judicial Tribunals. Article III of the
Constitution states that the “judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”64 Foreign affairs legalists view the growth of international institutions and
supranational courts as favorable developments in the creation of a global legal system.
To facilitate such a system, they support the domestic enforceability of judicial decisions
from international courts—the International Court of Justice, for example—within the
American legal system and the delegation of authority to international institutions.65
The Use of International and Foreign Law to Interpret the U.S. Constitution.
Foreign affairs legalists look favorably upon the citation of international and foreign law
in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.66 Recent cases where the Supreme Court
61
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has done this, including Roper v. Simmons67 and Atkins v. Virginia,68 which restricted
capital punishment for juvenile offenses and mentally retarded people, have received
their enthusiastic support.69
Global Constitutionalism. Global constitutionalism is an umbrella term for group
of real or hoped-for developments, including the creation of a global community of
courts,70 the rise of constitutional norms of international law that states cannot opt out
of,71 and the harmonization of domestic constitutional norms.72 The common theme is
that rules of international law will no longer rest solely on the consent of states—
consistent with the standard positivist conception of international law—but will now
reflect universal norms to which states must submit. This view appeals to many foreign
affairs legalists.
E. The Source of Foreign Affairs Legalism
What is the source of foreign affairs legalism? It is hard to identify the origin of
broad movements in legal thought, and we do not attempt to. Instead, we identify several
factors that are likely to have played a role in the emergence of foreign affairs legalism.
International Politics. The United States has always been a legalistic country with
powerful judges.73 But foreign affairs legalism is a relatively new phenomenon.
Academic support for this view goes back only a few decades.
Foreign affairs legalism had to await the emergence of the United States as a great
power. Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to forge a League of Nations and a Permanent Court
of International Justice was the first great legalist project, but it did not have the support
of the American public. The creation of the United Nations and the International Court of
Justice was the second great effort, but these institutions were frozen by the cold war
impasse between the United States and the Soviet Union. Legalist thinking in both
international law and foreign affairs law could not flourish during the cold war when one
67
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of the antagonists—the Soviet Union—explicitly rejected legalism as a bourgeois
construct. This was the era of supreme executive autonomy in foreign affairs: an
executive at war with a nuclear-armed opponent could not realistically be constrained by
courts.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the cold war and the
bipolar international system. The U.S. became the sole superpower and its capitalist
economic system and democratic political system became the models for post-Soviet and
other post-authoritarian states. In Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia, states
began to embrace democratic and capitalist governance systems modeled after the U.S.
system, including the adoption of constitutional systems based on the rule of law and the
separation of powers.
The supremacy of the United States during the post-cold war period gave rise to
two opposite reactions. Some people argued that the United States should use its
dominant position to remake international politics by promoting international law and
democracy,74 and the protection of human rights.75 The United States would take the lead
in extending the rule of law to international relations.
Other people argued that the United States now posed a major threat, as U.S.
officials would find it impossible to resist using their power to remake the world in the
American image.76 The United States would insist that other countries adopt American
political and economic norms against the wishes of their populations.
We suspect that both of these views fueled the rise of foreign affairs legalism. For
those optimistic about American power, quasi-wartime conditions no longer justified
executive autonomy. The executive could bow to the will of courts without risking
American security and in the process serve as a model for executives in other countries.
For those pessimistic about American power, domestic courts were the only possible
source of constraint on the executive given the international power vacuum,77 and hence
should be given full support.
74
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Domestic Governmental Structure and American Legalism. The growth of
executive authority in foreign affairs since the founding is unquestioned.78 The growth
has been both justified on institutional competency grounds79 as a response to the U.S.’s
evolution from a weak state to an international power and its attendant responsibilities,
and criticized as a deviation80 from the Constitution’s initial—but sparse—allocation of
foreign affairs authority. The growth of executive authority in foreign affairs, in turn, was
a subset of the broader growth of federal power and the rise of the post-New Deal
administrative state.
Yet this development has always been accompanied by uneasiness. For formalists,
the growth of executive power seems to “unbalance” the balance of powers among the
different branches of government and hence to violate the intent of the Framers.81 In light
of Congress’s acquiescence in the growth of executive power—its general refusal to
counter executive aggrandizement—these scholars argue that the courts should pick up
the slack.82 This argument may well have drawn strength from the emergence of the view
in the 1950s and 1960s that the Supreme Court can and should serve as an agent for
social change. There is also a pragmatic argument that the judiciary has certain
advantages for foreign affairs. This argument is that the judiciary takes a longer-term
view than the executive does, and acts dispassionately whereas the executive either acts
emotionally or is excessively influenced by politics.83 If the rise of the executive reflects
one type of pragmatism that emphasizes the need for flexibility in foreign affairs, the rise
78
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of foreign affairs legalism expresses a different type of pragmatic argument that reflects
the age-old fear that an unconstrained executive will engage in abuse.84
II. The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism
A. The Empirical Record: Do Judges Favor International Law More Than Executives?
1. The American Judiciary’s Contribution to International Law
Foreign affairs legalists celebrate the American judiciary’s contributions to
international law but they can only point to a few concrete accomplishments. A few
judge-made doctrines put limited pressure on the political branches to comply with
international law. The Charming Betsy canon makes it more difficult for Congress to pass
a statute that violates international law by requiring Congress to be clearer than it would
otherwise be. International comity rules, in limited circumstances, avoid violations of
international jurisdictional law that suggest that certain types of disputes are best resolved
in the state with the most contacts to the litigation. The federal court’s admiralty
jurisprudence has developed in tandem with admiralty cases in other states, and in this
way could be considered a contribution to international law. One could also point to the
willingness of the federal courts in cases like Missouri v. Holland85 to suspend federalism
constraints in order to enforce treaties, but these cases are weak and inconsistent.86
Moreover, the empirical literature regarding the judiciary’s support of
international law is thin. Benvenisti cites a handful of cases that suggest that national
courts—mainly in developing countries—have used international law in an effort to
constrain their executives. Koh also cites a very small number of cases—his best
examples are American Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases, which we discuss below.
Slaughter rests much of her argument on the rise of international judicial conferences,
where judges from different countries meet and exchange ideas. She does not provide
evidence that these conferences have affected judicial outcomes; another possibility is
that judges enjoy meeting each other and learning about foreign judicial decisions but do
not, as a matter of pragmatics or principle, allow what they learn to affect the way that
they decide cases.87
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In contrast, many court decisions and judge-made doctrines cut against the claims
of the foreign affairs legalism. The early decision in Foster v. Neilson88 to distinguish
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, recently reaffirmed in Medellin v.
Texas,89 ensures that many treaties cannot be judicially enforced. These rules have been
reinforced by the reluctance to find judicially enforceable rights even in treaties that are
self-executing. The tradition of executive deference also limits the judiciary’s ability to
contribute to international law. The judiciary generally prefers following the executive’s
lead to pushing the executive toward greater international engagement. In statutory
interpretation cases, courts frequently defer to the executive.
On questions of international law—the area most important to foreign affairs
legalists—the judiciary’s record is poor. In the notable federal common law case,
Paquete Habana,90 the Supreme Court made clear that the executive could unilaterally
decide that the United States would not comply with customary international law (CIL),
in which case the victims of the legal violation would have had no remedy. Courts have
held that both the executive and Congress have the authority to violate international
law,91 and that violations of international law cannot be a basis for federal question
jurisdiction.92 For example, the Supreme Court found that an illegal, extrajudicial
abduction that circumvented the terms of an international extradition treaty did not
preclude a US trial court’s jurisdiction over the abductee.93
The Supreme Court’s treatment of international law in Medellin v. Texas94 is also
instructive. Here, the Court held that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was
not self-executing or judicially enforceable in U.S. courts. That case involved a Mexican
national who had been deprived of his rights to consular notification under that
Convention after he had been arrested. He was later sentenced to death. The International
Court of Justice had held that the United States violated international law by failing to
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provide the Mexican national with access to his consulate.95 What is striking in the
present context is that not only did the Supreme Court refuse to intervene in order to
vindicate rights under international law (earlier it had held that the ICJ judgment was not
binding on U.S. courts), but also prevented President Bush from vindicating those rights.
Bush had tried to order state courts to take account of the ICJ ruling, but the Supreme
Court held that he did not have the power to do so.
The modern-day view that courts promote or should promote international law
draws its inspiration from two recent jurisprudential developments. The first is ATS
jurisprudence. The ATS gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear tort claims brought by
aliens that are based on international law violations.96 Although enacted in 1789, modern
ATS litigation began in 1980 in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.97 That case involved the torturemurder of a member of plaintiffs’ family, at the hands of a Paraguayan police officer,
who was named as the defendant. The court held that the defendant was liable for
damages because his actions violated international human rights norms.
Filartiga launched a wave of litigation98 against government security officials,99
former heads of state,100 and multinational corporations101 (states and current heads of
state are generally protected from litigation). In all of these cases, plaintiffs have pled—
often with success—that treaties or norms of CIL prohibited a range of activities,
including summary executions, disappearances, and war crimes, and complicity in these
activities. Though many individual defendants are judgment-proof because they do not
have assets in the United States, the complicity claims have been brought against
multinational corporations, which usually have assets in the United States and thus can be
made to pay damages.
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ATS litigation arguably promotes international law by making international
lawbreakers potentially liable for large damage judgments in the United States. American
courts have also, arguably, developed and strengthened international law by applying
international norms in case after case, in the process fleshing them out and giving them
credibility. Under basic principles of international law, a norm of CIL can exist if states
consent to it, and domestic court judgments can be evidence of state consent. It is
difficult to know how important these phenomena have been—few defendants have paid
damages and the effect of American courts’ judgments on other nations is unknown.
Moreover, the legalist claim that ATS litigation supports international law has
been challenged. No other country permits tort actions for violation of international law,
as noted by a plurality of the ICJ, which concluded that the ATS’s broad form of
extraterritorial jurisdiction does not have general approval of the international
community.102 The British House of Lords has also questioned the unilateral extension of
jurisdiction that the ATS embodies.103 Even the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez
Machain limited the sources of CIL and required that a CIL norm must be sufficiently
obligatory, specific and universal for an ATS claim.104
The second body of law involves constitutional interpretation. In a series of cases,
the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted ambiguous constitutional norms in light of
foreign materials—including international law, foreign law, and the judgments of
international and foreign courts. In Atkins v. Virginia,105 the Court held that execution of
the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth amendment. In
Roper v. Simmons,106 the court held that execution of people for crimes committed when
they were juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. In Lawrence v. Texas,107 the Court
struck down a state law criminalizing sexual sodomy. In all of these cases, the Court cited
international treaties, foreign constitutions, foreign law, or foreign institutional practices
as support for its holding.
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The United States government has never agreed by treaty that executing mentally
retarded people violates international law. In Atkins, the Court appears to be trying to
bring the United States into line with the norms and practices of other states.108 Whatever
the Court’s reasons for doing this, the effect is to bind the United States to treaties and
norms of CIL that it would otherwise either refuse to agree to, or violate. However, these
cases have proven to be extremely controversial and provoked a political backlash. In
recent years, the Supreme Court has backed away from this practice.109
We should also mention recent developments that postdate the rise of foreign
affairs legalism—the war-on-terror cases, in particular Hamdan v. Rumsfeld110 and
Boumediene v. Bush.111 In Hamdan, the Supreme Court held that military commissions
established by the Bush Administration violated a provision of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice that incorporated international law.112 In Boumediene, the Court held that
federal habeas jurisdiction extended to Guantanamo Bay;113 although this case did not
rest on international law, it eliminated the Bush administration’s main reason for using
this location, and thus helped doom an institution that many people regarded as an affront
to international norms of legality.
Although these cases were qualified victories for foreign affairs legalism, their
immediate impact was limited. Very few detainees have been released as a direct result of
legal process,114 and, in fact, the Supreme Court followed its historical practice of
temporizing until the emergency had passed. Courts were largely deferential to the
executive branch from 2001 to today.115
In sum, U.S. courts sometimes promote international law, but their methods are
highly limited and their effects are unknown. In run-of-the-mill adjudication, including
statutory interpretation, the judiciary’s contribution has been limited, and possibly
negative. In ATS litigation, the judiciary’s contribution has been more substantial, but
these cases are limited to human rights and laws of war—two important fields of
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international law but only a narrow slice of a vast subject—and their effects have been
ambiguous. In constitutional interpretation, use of international and foreign law materials
has occurred in only a handful of cases, with ambiguous results, and has provoked a
backlash.
2. The American Executive’s Contribution to International Law
Let us compare the judiciary’s record with that of the executive. To keep the
discussion short, we will focus on post-World War II activity.
The executive has been the leading promoter of international law. It has
negotiated and ratified (sometimes with the Senate’s consent, sometimes with Congress’s
consent, and sometimes without legislative consent) thousands of treaties over the last
sixty years,116 including the fundamental building blocks of the modern international
legal system—such as the UN charter, GATT/WTO, the International Covenant for Civil
and Political Rights, and the Genocide Convention. The executive, through the State
Department, issues annual reports criticizing foreign countries for human rights
violations and the U.S. government has frequently, although not with complete
consistency, issued objections when foreign countries violate human rights. The
executive has also negotiated and signed other important treaties to which the Senate has
withheld consent—including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, the Covenant on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, among others.117 The
executive has also been instrumental in creating modern international institutions,
including the UN Security Council, the GATT/WTO system, the World Bank, and the
IMF.
Much of what we said might seem too obvious to mention. One can hardly
imagine the judiciary deciding on its own that the United States must create or join some
new treaty regime. But these obvious points have been overlooked in the debate about the
role of the judiciary in foreign affairs. Virtually everything the judiciary does in this area
depends on prior executive practice. Only the constitutional interpretation cases seem
truly judge-initiated—for in these cases, the Court sometimes cites treaties the U.S. has
not ratified, and sometimes cites the law of foreign nations.
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The claim that the judiciary can and even does play a primary role in the adoption
of international law is puzzling. In almost all cases, the judiciary must follow the
executive’s lead. This also means that if the judiciary interprets treaties and other sources
of international law in an aggressive way—in a way that the executive rejects—the
executive may respond by being more cautious about negotiating treaties and adopting
international law in the first place. This possible backlash effect has not been
documented, but is plausible. As we discuss in the next section, fears of judicial
enforcement of certain treaty obligations led to an effort by the Senate to ensure that
those treaties would not have domestic legal effect.
3. A Note on Congress
Where does Congress fit into this debate? Congress is an awkward problem for
the foreign affairs legalist because, aside from certain constitutional grants of jurisdiction
such as admiralty, the judiciary’s authority comes from Congress. Yet Congress has
never been as enthusiastic in its support of international law as the executive has.
Congress has passed numerous statutes with some relationship to foreign affairs.
Though the vast majority do not implicate sensitive foreign affairs concerns, these
statutes reflect some coordination with the executive. Between 1990 and 2000, the US
concluded 2857 executive agreements and only 249 treaties.118 On the more substantial
questions—for example, international trade119 or national security sensitive export
controls120—Congress delegates foreign affairs decisionmaking authority to the
executive. Despite these practices, Congress has generally been less internationalist than
the executive.
The Senate has refused to ratify several international conventions signed by the
executive, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(signed in 1977); the American Convention on Human Rights (signed in 1977); the
Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (signed
in 1980); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (signed in 1995).121 It took the
Senate forty years to ratify the seemingly uncontroversial Genocide Convention. Despite
the Clinton Administration’s decision to sign the Rome Statute creating the International
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Criminal Court (ICC), Congress passed the “Hague Invasion Act”122 to prevent any
cooperation with the ICC.
Another prominent example of Congress’s willingness to flaunt international law
is the Helms-Burton Act of 1996,123 which creates a right of action in US courts for a
national against anyone who buys, sells, leases or even engages in commercial activity
with respect to property confiscated by Fidel Castro’s government after 1959. The
European Union, Canada, Mexico and Argentina, among other countries, immediately
protested that the act constituted a violation of international law and passed “blocking or
antidote legislation” to prohibit cooperation with the US regarding Helms-Burton.124 To
maintain fidelity with international law, the President, each year, has had to exercise a
provision in the statute that allows him to delay temporarily the implementation of
Helms-Burton.125
In fact, it is nearly impossible to think of a single major international institution or
initiative that has originated with Congress. The executive generally moves first, and
Congress either acquiesces or obstructs.126 In the case of treaties, which require 2/3
consent of the Senate, there are, of course, many treaties that the executive has signed but
from which the Senate has withheld consent.127 A prominent example is the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a treaty that was carefully negotiated over a
decade, renegotiated to address President Reagan’s concerns, and endorsed since then by
executives of both parties. The Senate made clear that it would not consent to the Kyoto
Protocol, which at the time had the backing of the executive. The Senate also rejected the
League of Nations treaty, of course. After World War II, Congress refused to implement
the International Trade Organization Charter, and the executive had to negotiate a more
limited agreement in its place, GATT.
122

See American Service-members’ Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820 (2002)
(barring US cooperation with the ICC and authorizing the President to use all means necessary to release
any Americans held by the ICC).
123
See The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785
(1996).
124
BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 702 N.8 (5TH ED.,
2007). For additional discussion, see, e.g., Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The HelmesBurton Law and Its Antidotes: A Classic Standoff?, 7 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 95 (2000); Kim Campbell,
Helms-Burton: The Canadian View, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 799 (1997); Jurgen Huber, The
Helms-Burton Blocking Statute of the European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 699, (1997); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 419 (1996).
125
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act § 306(b), 110 Stat. at 821.
126
See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 132 (1999). See also WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER (2007)
(providing evidence that oversight is greater when there are partisan differences between president and
Congress).
127
See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 179 (1996) (“And if
the Senate has become more sensitive to the onus of explicitly rejecting what the United States and other
nations have labored to conclude, it has not hesitated to let treaties gather dust on Senate shelves.”).

25

Congress’ skeptical attitude toward international law has appeared in various
guises over the years. In one notorious example during 1950s, because of fears that
human rights treaties would interfere with American legal norms and (in the south) Jim
Crow laws, Senator Bricker of Ohio led a movement to amend the U.S. Constitution. The
so-called “Bricker Amendment” would have rendered all human rights treaties non-self
executing. Through the efforts of the executive—at that time, President Eisenhower—the
proposed amendment was defeated in exchange for a commitment by the executive that
the United States would not enter into human rights treaties.128 Twenty years later, in an
attempt to overcome continued opposition in the Senate and commit the United States to
international law, President Carter proposed the attachment of conditions to human rights
treaties, including non-self-execution provisions. This “made it possible for the Senate to
ratify not only the ICCPR, but also the Genocide Convention, the Torture Convention,
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.”129
In recent years, Congress has passed two statutes intended to limit the
applicability of international law to American practices. One example is the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,130 which barred the use of certain
international law-based defenses in habeas petitions, and another is the more recent
Military Commissions Act of 2006, which had a similar effect by providing that “no
foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the
courts of the United States in interpreting”131 the provisions of the then-amended War
Crimes Act.132 Both of these statutes had the support of the executive, to be sure. A few
members of Congress even went so far as to propose a resolution barring the Supreme
Court from relying on foreign and international law to interpret the Constitution.133
We will have more to say about the significance of Congress’s record. For now,
the important point to understand is that Congress either acquiesces in the executive’s
desire to commit the United States to treaties and international agreements or, in some
instances, it obstructs that commitment. Proposals designed to enhance congressional
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involvement in foreign affairs have accordingly never made much headway.134 The real
proponent of international law in American government is the executive.
4. The Case of Europe
Foreign affairs legalism in the academy has received a significant boost from
Europe. A familiar story describes how the national courts in EU member states advanced
European integration by submitting to the authority of the European Court of Justice on
matters of European law. In this telling, the member states have, from time to time,
regretted their commitment to European integration and sought to violate specific
obligations. The European Commission or other institutions brought claims against these
lawbreakers in the ECJ or the ECJ obtained jurisdiction through the preliminary reference
process. The nation states were prepared to defy adverse ECJ judgments but then a
surprising thing happened. The member states’ own national courts incorporated the ECJ
judgments into domestic law. This meant that member state governments could not defy
the ECJ without disobeying their own national courts—a step with explosive
constitutional implications and one that they were not prepared to take. A further
important element in this story is that the national courts were never explicitly authorized
by European treaty instruments or by their own governments to enforce European law.
Yet they did, and in this way played a crucial role in the promotion of international—
actually, regional—law, vindicating foreign affairs legalism.135
The conventional story leaves out some important facts. The impetus for the
entire European project came from national governments, not national courts. The
governments set up the European institutions in the Rome Statute and subsequent treaties.
Even more important, the national courts in many (but not all) of the European countries
initially served as a brake on the project. These courts found that the various treaties
violated national constitutional law, and so the project could be put into place only after
the national governments had modified their constitutions. National courts have, from
time to time, continued to express reservations about European integration, most
famously in the German case of Solange, which found that European law could be valid
only to the extent that it is consistent with German basic (constitutional) law.136
These judicial rulings time and again put a break on the EU project, and forced
national governments to scramble to change domestic laws and modify treaty law so as to
overcome judicial objections. The national governments have always met this challenge.
These governments, not the courts, have played the primary role in European integration.
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B. Incentives and Institutional Capacities of Judges and Executives
Consider the standard separation-of-powers conception of government, which we
present in caricatured form. The legislature deliberates and determines policy. It best
reflects the values and interests of the population because (1) members are directly
elected; (2) they are elected by relatively small groups of citizens and thus have finegrained information about the preferences of citizens; (3) they deliberate as a group,
facilitating information aggregation.
The executive implements the legislature’s policies by applying force as
necessary. A single individual must lead the executive so that the legislature (and the
public) can hold someone accountable for bad actions, and so that quick and decisive
action is possible. This is why a legislature cannot be given executive powers (unless it
simply delegates them as it does in parliamentary systems). At the same time, the
executive, even though elected, has poorer information about public values and interests
than the legislature does; and individuals given enormous power can be easily corrupted.
This is why the legislature, not the executive, has the policy-making function.
The judiciary hears disputes arising from ambiguities in the law as well as of the
constitution. Because it has the responsibility to implement the policies of the legislature
(including previous legislatures) and the constitution, the judiciary must be impartial. It
must also have legal expertise. That is why neither the executive nor the legislature can
be given judicial power. The judiciary becomes involved (usually) long after a law has
been passed because a dispute must arise before it has jurisdiction. The case or
controversy rules helps maintain judicial impartiality by providing distance from events,
and it ensures a factual record, helping courts to interpret ambiguous law. But by the
same token, the judiciary is in no position to make policy or take executive action—
spheres therefore reserved for the executive and the legislature.
We could imagine giving substantial foreign affairs power to the legislature and
even the judiciary—more so than is done today. The legislature could have the power to
set foreign policy. All treaties and international agreements would have to be initiated
and ratified by the legislature. Perhaps, the executive could have a veto; perhaps, not. The
judiciary would interpret treaties and other sources of international law in the same way
that it interprets statutes and the common law. It need not give deference to the executive.
The executive’s obligation would be to carry out American treaty obligations and other
foreign policies prescribed by Congress.
Such an approach is hardly impossible; indeed, it is easy to imagine. This was, in
fact, the system that existed during the period of the Articles of Confederation, when the
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executive power was held by Congress. But it is not the approach that we have now.
Congress has acquiesced in the rise of executive primacy in foreign affairs, even going so
far as to enact vague statutes that delegate enormous foreign affairs powers to the
executive. Courts have been deferential to executive interpretations of international law
and frequently unwilling to hear disputes about executive foreign policy actions.
Let us consider some possible reasons for this state of affairs.137 Some of these
reasons have been suggested by judges and other political actors; others are more
speculative.
Why shouldn’t legislatures determine policy and legislate with respect to foreign
affairs more than they have? The best answer is that foreign policy addresses a more
varied and complex set of agents and events than domestic policy does. Consider trade
policy. A state may want to establish a set of tariffs on foreign imports for various
reasons—to raise revenue, to protect industries, to reward friendly countries and to
punish unfriendly countries. To do so, it must take into account the friendliness and
unfriendliness of foreign countries. A country’s friendliness, however, is difficult to
quantify; it requires nuanced judgments about capacities as well as behavior. For
example, a government with a population hostile to Americans might secretly provide
basing privileges that enable the United States to perform an important military mission.
The U.S. government might want to reward this government with favorable tariffs, or it
might not, or it might want to lower tariffs with the understanding that they will be raised
again unless the foreign government acts in a certain way. Now consider that there are
nearly 200 countries, and there are many other aspects of their relationship with the
United States—encompassing not only trade, but also military cooperation, development
cooperation, law enforcement, and much else.
How could a legislature address these complexities? A modern legislature such as
the U.S. Congress has an enormous amount of business. Accordingly, it could not address
a particular relationship with foreign countries on an ad hoc basis, as events dictate. In
principle, it could pass a statute that in great detail explains that the president must do X
if the country does Y, where X could be lowering tariff barriers (a certain amount) and Y
could be providing military assistance. But given the fluidity and unpredictability of
foreign affairs, and Congress’s limited time and resources for evaluating relationships
with dozens of countries, such a statute would be hard to imagine. While Congress sets
tariff policy by incorporating executive-negotiated trade treaties, it also has delegated
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immense authority to the executive to suspend trade, impose sanctions, and in other ways
punish and reward foreign countries that are uncooperative.
In domestic matters, Congress also delegates but not as frequently. Consider tax
policy. Congress sets taxes, which apply to hundreds of millions of people. The sheer
volume of affected persons means that only very general rules can be used to regulate. It
is impossible for the government to have an individual relationship with every person or
firm the way it does with foreign countries. As a result, the government cannot adjust its
relationships to people on an individual basis. It can do this with foreign countries. But
these relationships, which require constant adjustment in light of changing events and the
behavior of the party on the other side, involve constant monitoring and a consistent
course of action. Congress is institutionally disabled from engaging in such behavior.
Similar points can be made about courts. There are several reasons why courts try
to minimize their involvement in foreign affairs. As we have just seen, there is a practical
problem: the absence of congressional involvement. Because Congress passes so few
foreign affairs statutes, or passes statutes that simply delegate to the president without
clear standards, judges have little statutory law to enforce. Accordingly, if courts are to
constrain the executive, they will have to rely on constitutional norms. However, the
written constitutional rules touching on foreign affairs are extremely vague, consisting
only of the vesting clause, the commander-in-chief clause, the ambassadors clause, a
handful of congressional powers (to declare war, to define the law of nations), and the
treaty clause.
To constrain the executive, the courts would have to apply subsidiary rules and
doctrines that flesh out the vague written standards in the constitution. The courts have
done that for the president’s domestic powers. Why haven’t they done the same for his
foreign affairs powers? Imagine, for example, that the bill of rights were applied to
foreign policy to the same extent that they are applied to domestic policy. The answer
seems to be that judges are even less informed about foreign affairs than legislators are,
and even less able to inform themselves. A legislature can at least create a committee that
specializes in foreign affairs and takes a leadership role. Courts have no similar ability to
divide labor internally and thereby enable specialization.
Courts are also very slow and highly decentralized. An important foreign policy
issue arrives on the judiciary’s doorstep in the context of a specific legal dispute that
might have only a glancing relationship with the issue. Consider Mingtai v. UPS, a runof-the-mill contract dispute between two private firms over liability for a lost package
that turned on the explosive issue of whether Taiwan is part of China for purposes of the
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Warsaw Convention.138 Supposing a judge is even capable of answering this question,
one must doubt whether it makes sense to wait for a contract dispute to arise before
addressing an issue at the heart of the relationship between the United States and the
largest nation in the world. The district court judge may get the answer right or wrong,
with appeals up the chain. In the meantime, other district and appellate court judges may
disagree. The upshot would be a muddy and potentially destabilizing message produced
by a group of non-experts over many years.
We have largely discussed institutional capacity so far but another dimension of
the question concerns incentives. One might argue that judges should be given a more
prominent foreign affairs role because they are impartial. Katyal and Jinks argue that
judges have longer time horizons than the executive because judges serve for life,
whereas the executive has a four-year or, at best, an eight-year time horizon.139 For this
reason, judges are more likely than the executive to take foreign policy positions that are
in the long-term interest of the United States.
Impartiality is just the flip side of accountability. Executives (and legislators) face
elections so that their incentives will be aligned with the public interest. A number of
factors ensure that their time horizons are not too short. First, the executive belongs to a
party that has an infinitely long time horizon, and which can exercise at least some
control over the president’s behavior. Second, executives care about their legacy. Third,
the executive faces numerous external constraints that limit its ability to promote shortterm outcomes. For example, the bond market reacts negatively to policies that move
resources from the future to the present, making it difficult for the government to borrow
in the short-term and creating political pressure from bondholders. Fourth, and related,
the public cares about the long term as well as the short term. They can thus punish
myopic behavior at the polls even though polls are held only at four-year intervals.
For the judiciary, the main problem is accountability. Since federal judges are not
elected, they have very weak incentives to act in the interest of the public. Thus, there is
always a danger—one that is well-documented140—that judges will be partial rather than
impartial, that they will allow themselves to be influenced by their ideological
preferences. Meanwhile, because the public has no ability to discipline judges who make
bad foreign policy choices, judges have little incentive to engage in the kind of pragmatic
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balancing that is the essence of foreign affairs. This problem is clear in ATS cases. The
executive understands that it needs to cooperate with dictatorships in a range of matters
and cannot always punish them for committing human rights abuses (even when the
executive generally supports international human rights law). Judges, by contrast, are
focused on the violations of international human rights law in the cases before them and
are less likely to appreciate the executive’s broader, strategic concerns about the foreign
policy hazards of provoking foreign countries.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that judges are typically not cosmopolitan
figures. The executive, whatever the personal characteristics of any occupant, is forced to
pay attention to international relations because of its responsibility for national security.
In the course of dealing with foreign countries, the executive is compelled to consider
their values and interests. In the United States, presidents often have significant foreign
policy experience; even when they do not, they participate in foreign policy debates and
consult with experienced foreign policy advisors. In foreign countries, presidents and
prime ministers often serve as foreign ministers before taking office. Judges, by contrast,
are intensely local figures. In the United States, judges typically are former prosecutors or
law firm partners who have had little contact with foreign issues, aside from the
occasional multinational corporation that is a client or defendant, and almost no contact
with complex foreign affairs questions. In many foreign countries, judges rise through a
civil service bureaucracy, facing run-of-the-mill cases involving commercial matters and
crime, and very few cases involving foreign affairs. Given these widely understood facts
about the judiciary, the office is unlikely to attract people with a great deal of interest in,
and experience with, foreign affairs.
To sum up, the case for giving the judiciary a greater role in foreign affairs has
not been made. The judicial office has evolved over the years to handle domestic
disputes, not foreign policy disputes, and reorienting it to address foreign affairs would
require radical surgery. Judges lack the temperament and ability for addressing foreign
affairs, and their impartiality, such as it is, comes at a price: they are not accountable to
the public and have little feel for international politics and the public interest. The
executive, by contrast, is the primary foreign affairs office because it is best suited for
foreign affairs issues. What is claimed to be its major disadvantage—that the executive
has a short-term perspective driven by elections—is in fact one of its chief merits,
namely, that it is accountable to the public.
C. What Does It Mean to Promote International Law?
We have argued that history shows that the executive has been the primary motor
for promoting international law, while the judiciary has more frequently served as break
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or (in most cases) a passenger. This record is consistent with the incentives and capacities
built into these offices. The executive takes an interest in international law because it has
the responsibility for national security; the judiciary does not. And the executive’s office
is supplied with the tools it needs for addressing foreign affairs; the judiciary lacks those
tools.
We have generally assumed that “promoting international law” is a good thing.
We take this premise from the foreign affairs legalists. But there are some important
ambiguities about this premise, which we will address now.
“Promoting international law” has a traditional meaning that has in recent years
come under pressure. Under the traditional view, international law is based on the
consent of states. Promoting international law, then, means obtaining the consent of states
to new international treaties and institutions, and encouraging states to keep their
obligations. An executive might promote international law by consenting, on behalf of its
state, to existing multinational treaties; negotiating new treaties; expressing agreement
with norms of customary international law; and ensuring that its state complies with its
international legal obligations.
In this positivist conception, international law need not always be “good” in the
sense of promoting global values. The Nazi-Soviet Pact, which carved up Poland, was a
piece of international law and clearly not good. Thus, we should be aware that when we
say that the executive is in the best position to promote international law, we mean that
the executive can promote international law for ill as well as for good. The precise way to
put this point is that the executive has better incentives and capacities for using
international law to promote the national interest than the judiciary does. The national
interest will not always coincide with the global interest. Nonetheless, if we take the
perspective of national interest, then foreign affairs legalism has little to recommend it.
The best case for foreign affairs legalism rests on a different conception of
international law. On this view, international law consists of a web of norms that extend
beyond ordinary treaty and customary international law, and include jus cogens rules that
reflect fundamental values in the international order.141 Typical examples of jus cogens
norms include prohibitions on aggression, torture, and genocide. In the hands of some
scholars, general human rights norms have become part of a kind of “world
constitution.”142 The key idea here is that these norms do not depend on state consent.
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States cannot withdraw their consent from them; any effort to do so is simply a
manifestation of an intention to engage in illegal behavior.
Foreign affairs legalism draws its spirit from this conception of international law.
The executive shoulders the national interest, which may reflect a selfish or short-sighted
preference for behavior that aggrandizes the nation but hurts people in other countries.
No national institution can check this behavior except courts because of their
independence—their lack of accountability to the people. By enforcing and hence
preserving jus cogens and related norms, and by developing them, courts promote
international law, rightly understood, in the teeth of executive interests.
One is more likely to find this kind of argument in a European international law
journal than an American one, but it provides the best case for foreign affairs legalism.
Nonetheless, it is seriously flawed.
The idea that jus cogens and other fundamental norms underlie international law
and exist in the absence of state consent is highly controversial, to say the least.143 It is a
throwback to natural law thinking that was repudiated more than a century ago. Natural
law ideas were repudiated because in practice states could not agree what they were, and
so they could not provide grounds for resolving international disputes. Positivism took
over because states could at least refer to the sources of law they had consented to, which
could be made as precise as they chose. Further, because states—so far—have expressed
their consent to the substance of these norms—against torture, for example—the idea that
jus cogens norms somehow transcend state consent has never been tested. It remains in
the realm of speculation.
Finally, no one has explained why courts would, and how they could, enforce
international legal norms against the interest of their own nations, as perceived by the
executive. Judges have no particular incentive to defy their own national governments for
the sake of ambiguous international ideals. And if judges did, it is not clear how they
could constrain their governments, most of which demand, and receive, freedom of action
in foreign affairs.
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D. An Alternative View
We are now prepared to state the case for executive primacy in foreign affairs
law. Executive primacy holds that courts should, as much as possible, solicit the
executive’s views on disputes involving foreign affairs and defer to these views except
under unusual circumstances. In cases of statutory and treaty interpretation (including the
question of whether at treaty is self-executing or creates judicially enforceable rights), the
judiciary should defer to the executive’s views as much as possible. In cases of federal
common law development, the judiciary should give the executive the power to opt out of
judge-made doctrines (as in the Paquete Habana). When the executive declines to give
its views, the judiciary should not necessarily understand its task to be that of promoting
international law. It may be proper to interpret statutes so as to avoid violating
international law, but only to the extent the alleged international law norm has been
endorsed by the executive (in a treaty, by endorsing a particular CIL norm or in other
ways).
Similar points apply to constitutional interpretation. It may be proper for judges to
take account of foreign and international law when interpreting American constitutional
law because these sources of international law provide a fund of knowledge.144 But courts
should not do this in order to promote international law. That is a task for the executive.
The case for executive primacy rests on the constitutional division of labor
between the executive and the judiciary. The U.S. Constitution, as interpreted over the
years, has given different incentives and capacities to the holders of these offices.
Executives are held responsible for national security and the national interest in general.
The judiciary is not. Executives who seek to do well thus have strong incentives to
advance international law in a way that promotes the national interest. Because Congress
has refused to assert itself in foreign affairs thus far, the judiciary must either defer to
executive-made foreign policy or invent its own. Because the judiciary has no foreign
affairs expertise and, given its decentralization and traditional inward focus, no means for
developing such an expertise, it should defer to the executive.
Our case for executive primacy rejects an enhanced role of the judiciary in foreign
affairs. If the promotion of international law and an international legal system is in the
national interest, the executive—not the judiciary—is the branch best placed to achieve
this goal. The political question doctrine,145 the act of state doctrine,146 international
144
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comity doctrines147 and deference to the executive’s treaty interpretations,148 for example,
have properly barred the judiciary from making foreign affairs determinations for which
it is poorly suited. Increased deference to the executive would ensure that the most
accountable branch continues to exercise primary foreign affairs decisionmaking
authority.
Conclusion
Foreign affairs legalism awaits an advocate who not only asserts the value of
legalizing foreign relations, but also roots this assertion in a plausible account of judicial
motivation and institutional competence. Until such a theory is advanced, the tradition of
judicial deference to the executive in matters of foreign affairs deserves continued
support.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
eric_posner@law.uchicago.edu
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